Monday, March 24, 2008

THE EFFECT OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET ON MUSIC ARTISTS’ RIGHTS

CHAPTER 1 : “FAIR USE” IN THE DIGITAL ERA

In the USA and in the UK the sine quo non of copyright is originality. “Fair use” and “fair dealing” protect such originality via statutes on copyright protection. These copyright laws only protect original works of authorship, including musical and literary work, and sound recordings. Originality is the key element, and peripheral to this there is also some minimal degree of creativity. As Wernick notes “…One must not overlook the critical initial breath of life of originality as an element for the very existence of copyright rights…”. Torremans observations encapsulate the whole essence of copyright. He notes that “…work need not be “substantial”, as a couple of notes and chords will be sufficient to attract copyright, but a minimum investment by the author of “skill, judgement and labour have to be met”. It is against this backdrop that the “fair use” and “fair dealing” protective measures are employed. In Mid America –v- James Kirk, the Court of Appeal defined originality as work compilation having original selection, co-ordination or arrangement. The time and money invested to gather and report information is irrelevant, since originality and not industry, is the touchstone of copyright protection.

“Fair use” and “fair dealing” are similar copyright concepts. “Fair dealing” has been a defence since the Copyright Act of 1911, albeit for a limited class of infringements. Its origin in law emanates from the case of Carey –v- Kearsley. However, it is the expression “fair use” which is prominent in American copyright law.

From many decided cases, it is envisaged that “fair dealing: is not easy to define, and it is in this vein that Lord Denning MR in Hubbard –v- Vosper 1972 opined that “…it is a question of degree” and each case should be looked at on its own merit.

In Carey –v- Kearsley, Lord Ellenborough admitted that the use of another’s work was “fair dealing”, but Scott –v- Stanford, Vice Chancellor Wood granted an injunction to restrain publication of another’s work because the defendant’s use of work was not “fair use”. The legal position in section 30 (1) of the 1988 Act however, provides that “…a sufficient acknowledgement identifying the author owns copyright and any other description is sufficient to define “fair dealing””. In Pro Sieben Media AG –v- Carlton U.K. Television Limited and another it was a question of degree or of fact and expression. How much of the copyrighted work taken is another issue which the court has to consider. In deciding whether there has been a “substantial taking’, the court looks at the quality not the quantity of work, extracted. The work taken has to be of “qualitatively significant”. In music, this could be just a note or a sound.

The nature of copyright is to protect the work of the original author. It is a kind of monopoly. Like any other property right, the owner is given certain rights to exclude others from access to, or use of his property, or to decide whether or not to authorise others to use it, and to set the conditions for any such use. Copyright is an asset and, like any other asset can be sold or licensed. The license is a mechanism available to safeguard the public interest and has not been popular with copyright owners especially the compulsory licence.


In the case of music copyright, it can be bought for very minimal amounts – compared to what it is worth – by record companies who manage up and coming artists. These artists are desperate to be famous and to make money, so they will usually agree to sell off their copyright to the music industry, which in turn become the owners of the copyright. This change in ownership on would recommend, requires a change in the definition of ownership.

The basic principle of the Act in relation to the ownership of copyright in work at any given time depends on the transactions that have taken place since its initial creation and therefore the Act cannot itself indicate with certainty the current ownership of any particular copyright. What the Act does is to prescribe who the initial owner of the copyright is for the purpose of the future, often complex transactions that may subsequently take place and will also govern entirely. In the light of this change one questions whether originality as protected by “fair use” should remain.

The seminal case of Feist Publications –v- Rural Telephone stipulated that the primary objective of copyright is ”to promote the progress of science”. The question, which arises from this, is whether originality alone should be a basis for attracting copyright in this digital era. Despite work being original, should not the definitions of “fair use”, “fair dealing” and “substantial copying” be adapted for the digital age?

Under some circumstances, copying is believed to be socially desirable and yet not unfair to the copyright owner. This is true where the benefits to society as a whole outweigh the relatively small amount of potential harm to copyright. The law has been revised to provide guidelines fro what kinds of uses are considered fair. This means that there is no room for flexibility in every case to determine the effect a particular use may have on the rights of a copyright owner.

















Everyone has a different idea of what actually constitutes being “fair”. Courts look at: the purpose and the character of the use; they take into account whether such use is commercial or non-profit making such as for educational use, use of copyrighted work for educational or intellectual purposes is more likely to be considered fair. Courts also look at the amount and substantiality of the portion of copyrighted work used – the larger the extract used, the greater risk of copyright infringement. The effect of use on the potential market is also considered – has there been any damage in lost business or has the use enhanced the sale when the work was quoted or used in another media. Traditionally, the courts have also looked at a number of factors when determining whether there has been “substantial copying”. Amongst these are the quality and quantity of what is taken, the intention of the user, and whether or not the two parties are in competition.

Quality plays a very substantial role. If the portion used is held to be “qualitatively significant”, such as would be the case is the riff, hook or chorus of a song were taken, that use will probably be deemed to infringe. The question of the quality of the work is determined by comparing the part taken – the sample – with the source from which it was taken, and not the work in which it ultimately appears.

This was expensive to develop. This has made it advantageous to transform many kinds of information from analogue to digital forms of transmission. There are two main advantages of digitisation: copying and transmission can be made to take place without degradation, so that every copy is perfect; and copies can be transmitted to millions of people at the same time at very low cost. Given the nature and the realities of the internet and digital technology, - it is global, real time, cheap and benefits both artist and the consumer alike – “fair use”, “fair dealing” and “substantive taking” should, it is submitted, adapt to fit in with the new technology. Such a move would have to accommodate “use” being redefined away from educational and public interest considerations, more towards social factors. What constitutes “substantial taking” for a sampler, would also have to accommodate a recognition that samplers are artists in their own right, and their work also makes a significant financial contribution to society. In many cases maybe more so than the work from which they borrowed. This suggests the need for greater tolerance of the sampler’s parasitic use of the “original” work.

In Harper & Row –v- Nation Enterprisesthe Supreme Court found the amount used from the copyrighted work not to be a fair use; whereas in Campbell –v- Acuff-Rose Music Inc. the Court found that the work taken was fair. In Sony Corp –v- Universal Music Inc. the Court held that any individual may reproduce copyrighted works for “fair use”, the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive rights to such. Even though 100% of the work was copied, it nonetheless constituted “fair use”. In Hubbard –v- Vosper (1972) relevant factors included the amount of the work used, and whether the true intention of the reviewer was to damage the author of the original work rather than to review the work.

Section 29 (1) of the 1988 Act provides that there is no infringement in fair dealing with a literary, musical or artistic work if done for the purpose of research or private study. Section 107 of the 1976 Act provides for a general defence of “fair use” and a range of limitations on exclusive rights of copyrighted work. It provides that fair use is not infringement if the use is reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for the purpose of, amongst others, criticism, comment, news reporting and teaching. In determining whether use is fair, the factors to be considered are, the nature of copyrighted work, the purpose and character of use, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to copyrighted works as a whole, and the effect of the use upon a potential market.

The other area most pertinent to this discussion is the “moral and economic rights” of the copyright holder. It is important to note that the author of the work has the “moral right” as well as the “economic right”. These rights can sometimes vest upon somebody other than the author by assignment. The question of moral rights will only arise where there is an infringement of the work. Moral rights prohibit a performer from making any change in the composition without the consent of the composer.

If no such consent is obtained and the modified version is performed in public for profit, a fine or imprisonment may result. The question to be asked is: what are the boundaries of the moral right of integrity and how far can the recording or performing artist go in interpreting the work of another before such interpretation constitutes distortion and mutilation? Furthermore, when an exploiter purchases all rights in a song, should he not be able to with it as he wishes?

Three requirements must be fulfilled before an action can be brought against an infringer: there must be a treatment of the work or any part of it; it must be derogatory, and there must be an infringing act in relation to the modified version. Bentley defines “treatment” as addition to, deletion from, or alteration or adaptation of work. Since the sampler only takes part of the work, there would be a different context, which would appear to be addition to, and addition and deletion from the whole work.

Even if a treatment does not amount to distortion, it will be derogatory if it prejudices either the honour or reputation of the author. In Hawkes & Son Ltd. –v- Paramount Film Service Ltd twenty-eight bars of a song lasting 50 seconds was held to be substantive copying. As Lord Hanworth emphasised the “quantum” was substantial. For Romer LJ the quality was the principal air, and Slesser LJ emphasised that quality and quantity are “inseparable”.

Based on the above discussion and the nature of digitalisation and the internet, the present writer submits that the concepts of “fair dealing”, “fair use” and “substantive copying” are too restrictively interpreted in an age where digitalisation and the internet give musicians a much exposure and benefits. People in all corners of the world can now access the works of unknown and also established artists. Before the Internet and its digital co-horts, this added-extra was not possible.

Also, it is submitted that music should be fulfilling a social not just economic function. Should the poor of the world be denied the benefits of music just because greedy artists and record companies wan maximum returns? If one is to compare the earnings of artists and record industries since the emergence of the Internet and the digital revolution, it will show a dramatic increase due to exposure and recognition which “old” and formerly “dead” artists have had enough sampling. Some have revived their fortunes.


Ray Ku in his debate gives a different slant to digitalisation arguments. He sees he complexities and peculiarities of digitalisation and the Internet as a reason why copyright holders are often dissatisfied with samplers. He presents very strong and passionate arguments on “fair use”. He takes the view that copyright protection for digital works is no longer necessary, because the economics of digital technology annuls previous assumptions about the efficacy of a private property regime for information.

He opines that”…copyright is no longer needed to encourage distribution, because consumers themselves build and fund the distribution channels for digital content”. Gordon takes a different view. She economically analyses the copyright system, and sees it as creating private property in creative works so that markets can simultaneously provide economic incentives for authors and disseminate authored works.

The present writer agrees with Ray Ku’s opinion that digitalisation has rendered copyright vulnerable, even impotent. Because of the emergence of the phenomenon of Internet and “digital everything” in the music world, assumptions about the efficacy of a private property regime has been annulled.

Digitalisation has weakened the very existence of the monopoly of copyright, in that music can be delivered straight to the consumers without the need for middlemen. It can be shared amongst peers who after all are the ones who purchase the music. This can all be done with no need for a distributor. The middleman is just there to take chunks from those who are best deserving of musical enjoyment.

In view of this, the sampler wants “fair use” to be redefined, and the scope to be widened because he believes that copyright holder also took from others, or never wrote the song in the first place but borrowed from a fellow artist or “bought” by means fair or foul of the rights. Also in this scenario are record companies who invest no originality at all. All they have done is invested money, and so it is submitted have no moral authority to want to the redefinition that samplers do.

The question is should the goal post be moved to accommodate these new, fresh and exciting digital authors? It is submitted that their request should be considered in the light of their ability, creativity and advancement of science and technology. Also the exposure, revival and the revitalisation that most records have had since samplers and digitalisation have appeared on the scene. This should not be ignored, because sampling itself is an art form, and people should be afforded a place in the open market to exhibit their abilities.

Realistically what the samplers are doing is just taking a small part of an original work, creating a whole new original work for the enjoyment of many, exposing the rest to the world and leaving the copyright owner with 100% of what he had before, but with a higher kudos and greater recognition.







CHAPTER 2: COPYRIGHT JUSTIFICATION IN THE DIGITAL ERA

Given the global nature of the Internet, its innovations and its technological paraphernalia, a valid question is whether traditional music copyright tenets should prevail over the “vices” of online piracy and sampling, which themselves are facilitated by the Internet. The nature of the copyright is monopolistic and restrictive – seeking to monopolise and create wealth for a selected few. The Internet on the other hand, is innovative, non-restrictive, accessible, international and free for all. These two facets do not sit well together very well. Therefore, should the monopolistic nature of copyright prevail over the innovative and creative characteristics of the Internet? These questions amongst others direct this work into the domain of economic and labour theory jurisprudence. Spector takes the view that intellectual and industrial property rights are a device for protecting the economic interests of certain groups rather than an institution founded on reason. He further submits that “…realistically, copyright is not proprietary, but a legal monopolistic privilege”. To explain further, he talks about consequential justification of rights arising from workings of the institution whereby a person acting within the scope of that institution benefits from its efficiency and well-being. This argument borders around the economic and labour theories in that as society, and although we have been equipped with refined analytical tools for examining the fundamentals of legal, economic and social institutions the subject of private property is still not substantially dealt with.

Van den Bergh also enters the debate from an economic angle to highlight the role and social justification of copyright. He focuses on different kinds of economic analysis to confirm this, and even the empirical studies of copyright protection are in their infancy. He draws on Posner’s work to demonstrate the impact the judges make on economics, as their decisions are instrumental to realising certain goals of allocative efficiency. He posit that may legal rules, especially in the field of intellectual property law can only be explained by efficiency theories and the alternative theory with emphasis on private interests.

Posner and Landes sees copyright as a means for promoting efficient allocation of resources, but other legal economists including Kay disagree with this view. They submit that copyright protection should be explained on the basis of public choice insights. He further submits that copyright laws have evolved for the systematic purpose of securing rents for certain organised producer groups, primarily publishers, record companies, and over the last decades or so software houses. Although these academic arguments subsist, there is a downside to copyright protection that need to be carefully addressed – namely, that the allocation of exclusive rights limits the spread of information once created.

This should not be the norm because our society exists on information for the propagation of knowledge. The dilemma which society now faces is the lack of balance between the need for information production and dissemination. In view of this, it is submitted that music copyright should be limited to the scope necessary to provide incentive to create, and should minimise restrictions on access to musical works as this type of attitude is incompatible with the digital age. This argument adds impetus to the hypothesis for re-defining “fair-use”, “fair dealing” and “substantial taking” as they currently relate to music. This would enable more new up and coming artists to become effective players in the music production market, without the obstacles that presently hinder their creative abilities. Obstacles by the way, which are erected in many instances by big corporations.

Locke’s labour theory posits that a person is entitled to claim copyright in an item, because of the labour expended on it. That is a fair statement but should he not allow others to access his works since he as a musical artist may also have borrowed ideas from other? As so many musicians who claim copyright actually once borrowed ideas from others is the labour they expended worthy of such protection, or should they in turn be prepared to share? Also, what should be regarded as labour? Is it time spent writing a particular song or music or preparing the sound to accompany the music? Or, should it extend to investments made by record companies?

Record companies sit back and rely on the “sweat of the brow” and “labour” theories to acquire powerful copyright monopolies, when in fact they have nor=t extended any degree of labour as traditionally understood as based on labour theory.

It is a common knowledge that many artists who supply the intellect behind creative works are popular but poor, whilst record companies make monopoly profits from them. Musicians rarely earn royalties from the sale of their CDs. Often, they are in debt to the recording industry fro the cost of manufacturing, marketing and distributing their music because recording companies charge the artist for all the cost of production, marketing, promotion and other expenses. Some record labels still demand that artists surrender even larger portions of their royalties for the cost of encoding the song to digital format, encryption and digital delivery even in today’s digital world, in which the cost of digital distribution is non-existent. Ray Ku’s survey shows how difficult it is for an artist to receive such royalties from his or her recording company. For an artist to receive royalties, he must sell a million CDs. Often times, fro a new artist to achieve this mark it is an uphill struggle, because the recording companies deduct various costs from the musician’s royalties. Meanwhile it is interesting to know that the same million copies would have yielded the record company approximately $11 million in gross revenue and $4 million net. There is therefore a marked disproportion in profits to the record labels, relative to what he artists receive. Viewed in this context, record companies as copyright “owners” seem to have very flimsy moral grounds on which to badger samplers especially on the issue of copyright.

The survey further informs us that it is difficult for artists to earn significant income from song writing and composing. Roger McGuinn is a living testimony of how artists, although popular can remain poor and unable to support their family on record royalties alone. Some who are lucky make a living form live performances,

The reality of the matter though, is that very few musicians are able to make it into the top forty of any musical chart or even sell half a million albums. It therefore comes as no surprise that the artists are quite divided in their opinion with respect to their private sharing of digital content. It follows from this state of affairs, that free and non-commercial distribution of music should have a little or no impact on the incentive to create music. In fact, online piracy and sampling may give such artists the oxygen o publicity and exposure, giving them a renewed platform from which to catapult themselves to do live performances and earn a living. Also, to be sampled by any self-respecting rapper, endows an artist with great street credibility and respect. This in itself is a currency.

The evidence therefore suggests that the belief that “copyright equals incentive” is almost a fiction, which could not be further removed from the truth, especially when being applied to the field of music. It is highly unlikely that any aspiring artist thinks in terms of copyright at all. They are instead inspired by the financial rewards of becoming successful artists. As John Perry Barlow, a lyricist from the Grateful Dead and cyber-commentator observed, they are dreaming of financial rewards in general, and those financial rewards remain even without copyright’s exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute music. Also, musicians can and do earn substantial income by means other than selling copies of their works. McGuinn’s testimonyilluminated this, and was supported by Barlow. A further survey in 2001 shows that the experience can be quite lucrative, as in 2000 alone concerts in North America generated over $1 billion in revenue. This goes to prove that free music is a complimentary good that increases ticket sales and, according to Barlow, the group has had a policy of free taping during their concerts from the early 1970s and they confessed”…we are now the largest concert draw in America.” It would be interesting to know how many of those who attend such concerts were initially “turned on” to the artist via “online piracy”.

Or how many more were prepared to attend because they knew the artists were not “greedy”, and were happy for the public to hear their music for free. A whole new hip-hop generation may also have been introduced to the artist through sampling and associated collaboration.

This supports the proposition for a redefinition of “fair dealing” “fair use” and “substantial taking”. Allowing the public to copy works for personal use should be viewed in a positive light. Music artists can borrow the idea from Stephen King’s ransom approach to business.

Contrary to the canvassed views in support of copyright and its derivative incentive, the evidence indicates that copyright plays a de minimis role in encouraging the creation of music, or in maintaining that creativity.

Napster-like technologies and Internet can be a useful tool for improving artists’ ability to earn revenue as a result of their fame. Contrary to opinion, majority of artists do not have an impressive living form the sale and distribution of their music but they do so from their fame and publicity, which is the by-product of their record distribution. This would benefit the new or non0mainstream artists who are otherwise unable to capture the public’s attention through a more traditional media. Coupled with the low cost of the Internet, digital technology further allows creative solutions such as ransoming and tipping to increase revenue to artists without the need for denying the public access to their works. Although it is argued that some artists earn more under the now current copyright regime for the sale of physical copies of their works than they would if copyright were absent, there is even a stronger and a more interesting argument that most artists may, in fact be far better off in a world without copyright when one recognises the enormous benefits of internet and digital technology which offer alternative incentives to copyright.

It is submitted that in the digital world of the Internet, copyright distorts the market for music. The reality as observed by economists, is a mere trade off between providing incentives for the creation and access to the work. Where copyright is desirable, it is better kept below the level that maximizes the number of works created otherwise expansion of copyright would be outweighed by the higher costs of expression for works, which would have been created without the additional protection. These costs are objectionable because they are unnecessary and restrictive to work hence stripping resources from other areas of economy. Fisher notes that granting an artist property right gives him a monopoly and insulates him from price competition because competing works are imperfect substitutes. Fisher argues that this monopolist position allows the copyright holder a right to charge extortionate prices, substantiality above marginal cost.

This theory in part accounts for the high cost of music CDs. Record companies who produce and sell them hide behind the deterrence engendered by copyright to charge high prices and earn monopolistic profits. The result is a “catch-22” situation, where consumers who value the work are unable or willing to pay monopolistic prices. This problem is exacerbated by the economics of digital technology, whereby any price demanded by a copyright holder for digital work becomes monopoly profits, as there are minimal costs associated with digital distribution. The counter argument to the “free- for-all” economy is that presented by economic theory which posits that economic returns provide incentive for musical innovation, and if unchecked, online piracy will kill creativity. Spector suggests that the key concept of the economic theory of property rights is that of externality.

He draws from Demsetz’s quote to clarify the meaning of externalities. Van den Bergh brings in the view of prominent legal economists, Landes and Posner on efficiency while Field submits that the copyright law would accomplish very little if authors could not convey their rights to publishers.

In comparing statistics on record company and artists’ at the height of online piracy one finds there was an increase because of the exposure that free copying and distribution gave. This evidence strengthens still the economic objections to copyright protection submitted by Van den Bergh, an objection shared by Ray Ku’s view, who acknowledges that the argument for the protection of copyright has become unnecessary because Internet and digital technology has revolutionised dissemination of information. It is no longer necessary to treat the various interests as interchangeable and therefore related. The public can access music without the need for the vessels. Just as Professor Breyer predicted over thirty years ago, “…copyright works may not be entitled to copyright protection because the economics of publishing rendered copyright unnecessary”.

According to various academic submissions, it is safe to opine that despite the outcry against online piracy, music profits keep rising. It is arguable that the push to prevent online piracy is an attempt to restrict access to music so as to maintain a monopoly and retain all profits, without due regard for the social function which music fulfils. Most musical genres were created by those at the lower echelons of the economic strata.

It is people from these communities who are also most keen to gain access to music. The high cost of music CD/DVDs which copyright monopoly facilities, would, but for “piracy” prevent those who most appreciate music from gaining access to it because they are unlikely to be able to afford the amount of money which these products attract. The irony is that, given their economic predicament, they are the ones most likely to be “criminalised” by the disproportionate penalties creeping into copyright enforcement.
The Internet is equal to all the challenges that copyright argument would put forward. Grossman & Rigamonti highlight its ability for electronic transmission; creation of exact copies. They refer to its intricacies, which include browsing and various types of linking, framing, caching and mirroring. These are tools made readily available and accessible to the public world wide, with the main objective of benefiting them. This is a revolution in itself which should rightly beg the question of the merits of “old” standards. There should therefore be no complaints when the public use these very facilities for their intended purposes. It is a bit like the humble donkey that kicks. The Internet is being used to exploit consumers via adverts, e-commerce and online trade. When the public responds in kind the law intervenes as an obstacle. It is submitted that this is not fair game. The problem is not necessarily downloading.

Record companies and musicians with copyright monopolies are not annoyed that music is being downloaded; just that it is not being downloaded for a profit. If they could get monopoly profits from downloading, as they do from CD sales, there would be no problems. In view of this “fair use” for music should become more socially orientated, and permitted a certain degree of free downloaded so that the threat of heavy penalties can be ameliorated.

The “big issue” is whether the risks associated with these practices should prompt overreaction, which would unduly damage, inter alia, the global/transboarder flow of music. Music is a culture which knows no barriers and should not be artificially contained.

The general approach to implementation of copyright laws has been to put tight controls on music download with a healthy dose of derogations. The controls benefit the record companies, publishers, and musicians. Central to the controls are copyright laws that all users and copyright holders must observe. Relevant conditions for use of copyright works include that, the owner consents to his work being sampled or downloaded for the purposes which that owner is happy with. What is noteworthy about the conditions are the effective exceptions. A general right to use of copyright work seems not to have been conferred, but there are many instances which the use of certain copyright can be “lawful and fair” even where the copyright holder does not think so or consents.

In Re: Aimster Copyright Litigation the recording industry brought a case against Aimster for contributory and vicarious infringement of their popular music copyright in facilitating teenagers and young adults to swap music files over the internet. The swappers were ignorant of the implications of their activities but nonetheless they become liable as direct infringers. While Aimster who provided Internet access were contributory infringers though they were not actively downloading. Many arguments were advanced and it was held that the infringers are not vicariously liable because they were not an agent of the service provider. Also, it was discovered that not all the records downloaded were copyrighted.

Some belonged to who were pleased for the exposure the swapping gave to their record. The court considered many decided cases included, Sony Corp. of America Inc. –v- Universal City Studios Inc., to clarify points on contributory infringement but in the end the case was decided in favour of the plaintiff. This decision was clearly taken based upon economic theory. It was unfair to music lover who yet again are prevented from enjoying free access free access to music globally.




















CHAPTER 3: COPYRIGHT –v- TECHNOLOGY: WHICH SHOULD DOMINATE?

“From its beginning, the law of copyright had developed in response to significant changes in technology.” Goldstein confirms, “…Copyright was technology’s child from the start”. In the music world, these technologies are many and varied especially in this digital age. MP3 technology for example has caused the most controversy. The prime difficulty for copyright owners is its speed and flexibility, consistency of sound quality, the ease with which music can be recorded and the speed and globality with which it can be distributed. As Grosheide points out, the nature of MP3 allows large numbers of files to be stored efficiently with the ability to download faster, and distribute consistent sound quality from a computer’s hard disc through the Internet with each successive generation of copies. This is not the only such software, there are sophisticated competitors which facilitate swapping and sharing of files through central server, as in the MP3.com and Napster systems or peer-to-peer.

These present formidable challenge to music copyright protection. However, it is also acknowledged that the technological explosion, however sophisticated it may be, also holds the potential to cure the evil that plagues the music industry.
As Ray Ku observes, the characteristics of the digital technology which is at the root of the digital dilemma is that it can be used to facilitate and improve copying; it can also be used to restrict access to content. Within the music world this technology is therefore a double-edged sword. It can benefit the music industry as well as exploit it. Whilst they facilitate online piracy and sampling, they also enable music interests to safeguard their “rights”. This presents the moral and jurisprudential dilemma as to how far the music industry should be allowed to go in protecting their economic interests. From the perspective of economic rationale, the distinguishing characteristics of intellectual property is its “public good”; and public goods are characterised by their non-rivalrous uses so that consumption by one individual does not reduce its value for another. In view of this, the law should be reviewed and the fair use definition of copyrighted musical works be made more flexible. After all is said and done, music was originally created for the good of the public and for its enjoyment. Furthermore, sampling and online downloading increase the overall musical repertory and enhance consumer choice. A new flexibility would break this stranglehold by the musicians and the record industry over musical choices.

Though copyright rules are technologically driven, they are essentially law-and-policy based, so governments are only meant to amend copyright law if they think as a matter of policy, copyright interests are legitimately threatened. Where the subject of copyright protection is the lowly author who relies on pen, paper and intellect to painstakingly create a masterpiece, an aggressive copyright policy may be more acceptable, but this is not so with modern music. Today, the creation of music is quick, music is transient. We are not in the days of Handel or Beethoven symphonies that may each have taken several years and the endurance of several bouts of insanity before completion. Works of that era are very deserving of traditional “fair use” protection because they literarily toiled by the sweat of their brows. Given the quick and lucrative returns on modern music and culture of greater sharing should be encouraged.

One proposition is that both sides in this war should be left to fight it out via the use of technology, so that the one who is best at using it wins. The alternative is the status quo; where whilst relying on, and using technology extensively for its personal profit, the music industry is at the same time being over protected by legal intervention. It has access to the same technology as the pirates and samplers, and to much greater resources. Within this technology there is the capacity to control the “vices” affecting “their” copyright. The music industry has various options to control things. They have CD technology, which facilitates online piracy but can be technologically controlled via uncopiable CDs. They are frantically trying to regulate MP3 but this has proved an uphill struggle. Ray Ku advises about the existence of trusted alternatives to MP3, which is based upon the trusted system technology including SDMI. Carey and Wall submit that SDMI will not be a saviour to the industry because there are various problems. Rosenblatt informs about super-sophisticated monitoring techniques in from of Spread Spectrum Modulation (SMM), a system for sensitive information, which would allow information to be embedded in the digital musical work using the International Standard Recording Code (ISRC).

This may be the way forward, because as Rosen concedes, even with copyright law, there are not enough lawyers in the world to sue all the people there are to sue. Mann tells us that the real truth that,”…Rampant music piracy may hurt musicians less than they fear. The real threat – to listeners and, conceivably, democracy itself – is the music industry’s reaction to it.”. However, it is inconceivable to think or believe that the music industry will win by making music files effectively uncopiable. They should in effect respond by embracing the new opportunities provided by the Internet.

The Internet by its very nature is ungovernable, “…it challenges the law’s traditional reliance on territorial borders; it is “a space” bounded by screens and passwords”. Herewith the challenge.

Napster’s technology brought a great innovation and a true hybrid. Theirs was a “computing breakthrough on the level of the world wide web”. It was essentially an inventive step which perhaps was the first widespread use of peer-to-peer systems on the web with individual users computers directly linked to each other without a “client server” between them. Like the pretensions of copyright, such developments also promote and enhance science and technology. In view of this, the present writer sees the use of copyright law to suppress use of these technologies, as in itself preventing scientific development, and competition within music.

The big players who use the technology should therefore find their own method of dispute resolution. Fair dealing would then be redefined according to which side gets the upper hand. Ohm suggests regulatory devices be put in place for users to regulate themselves. This would be an alternative to strict copyright rules Goldsmith confirms that the general consensus is one of self-regulation over the Internet as legislators are finding it impossible to use the classical laws to regulate the new situations brought by the Internet. The present writer believes that self-regulation with some guidelines is a better way forward for those operating in cyberspace, this could lead to a re-definition of “fair use” and “fair dealing”. In the music world, it is important to note that hip-hop is the biggest musical art form ever. Why should record companies seek to kill sampling when it is so lucrative?

Whatever the justification of copyright laws it will be seen that they confer property rights which, in many respects, are more limited than those normally associated with property.

One reason for this can be seen in the dual principles contained in Article 27 UDHR which gives, inter alia, everyone the right to enjoy the arts and share in scientific advancement and its benefits, as well as the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 27 is indicative of how the law could seek to balance two contrasting interests in order that they may co-exist amicably in a bid to find appropriate solution for the fair dealing arrangement. Should the law continue as it is or possibly be extended to accommodate the growth of Internet and digital technologies that are here to stay?














CHAPTER 4: THE LITIGATION: A MORAL PERSPECTIVE

The majority of high profile claims must be judged against the background of what copyright does, protects and ought to protect. Also what rights should be expected within a liberal democracy such as is representative of the digital era. In the case of Napster the District Judge’s finding that there was a breach of copyright heavily relied on currently accepted definitions of “fair use”. The court laid such great emphasis on the distinction between whether the use was for non-profitable educational purposes of for commercial profitable use. The copyright pessimist do not challenge to expand copyright, especially in cases in which the expansion comes at the expense of other overriding societal interests. Natanel submits that instead of a market based approach; copyright should be interpreted under a democratic paradigm that recognises the need to maintain copyright as a means of supporting a “system of self-reliant authorship, diversity, and the dissemination of information” while imposing limits consistent with copyright’s democracy-enhancing function.

In Napster, the infringing acts were perpetrated because youngsters were frustrated with not being able to get accessible music. They were dissatisfied with the high cost if music, the whole idea of profiteering by a small minority group, so in response they set up their own system of “defiance”. Intellectual property is nothing but imaginary, set of fences and gates. People must believe in it for it to be effective. Clearly, in this digital era there is dissatisfaction with these fences and gates. There is an intimate link between respect for individual human rights and respect for a copyright system that values and promotes individual human creative achievement. This argument is in line with the redefinition or extension of “fair use” which will promote individual human creative achievement in this digital age.

The record company brought actions claiming contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. Napster countered this by submitting that their file sharing was “fair use”.

In addressing these questions, the district court concluded, ”…the recording companies establish a prima facie case for direct copying by Napster users because virtually all users were engaged in the unauthorised downloading or uploading of copyrighted music”. The court turned and analysed the four doctrines of fair use set out in the 1976 Act, submitting that the amount and substantiality of portions used, distinguish between this case and Sony Corporation of America –v- Universal City Studios Inc. in rejecting Napster’s defence.

Clearly, this judgement is an attempt to keep the defence of “fair use” restricted. It is an attempt to narrow and restrict the law at a time when it is imperative that the law should be extended to embrace and accommodate “fair use” in the digital age. The judgement is morally unsound because the record companies who brought this case have no moral authority to be worthy of such a decision. If one goes back to definitions – copyright protects the works of original authors, the one who created the work from the sweat of hid brow. Record companies did not create the works; they put no skill into it. All they have done is invest money. Money, which they got from the original, authors themselves through “management”. It is submitted that the legislators are dabbling in an area they know little about because they hope that digitalisation is just a flash in the pan. It will quietly die a natural death. On the current parameters of copyright protection, the fact that an online downloader would not be able to argue that what they are taking is insubstantial means that they are in breach, because they are copying and not paying. It is difficult to argue substantially under these circumstances, whereas a sampler can argue differently.

RIAA –v- Verizon Internet Services (“Verizon”) – a subpoena enforcement matter – represents a widening of the net against “online piracy”. Verizon, as an Internet Service Provider (ISP) relied on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 1998 to counter the RIAA’s allegations. The RIAA claimed that on behalf of copyright owners it was seeking the identity of any anonymous users of Verizon’s service who may have used them as a conduit to download songs from the Internet. The copyright owners can discern the Internet Protocol address, but not the identity of an alleged infringer – only the ISP can provide this. Verizon argued that the subpoena related to material transmitted over their network, not stored on it like in the case of Napster, and thus fell outside the scope of the subpoena power authorised by the DMCA. The RIAA countered the power under s.512 (h), DMCA applied to all ISPs, whether the infringing material is stored on or simply transmitted over their network.

Verizon was a test case on the application of copyright law to the Internet, especially to “innocent” ISPs. The court concluded that the subpoena power in section 17 USC and section 512 (H) DMCA applies to all ISPs, not just those providers who store information on their system or network at the direction of the user. It ordered the Verizon to comply with subpoena. Verizon is another instance of the law once again trying to restrict “fair dealing”. It is attempting to narrow and restrict the copyright law in this area. Further, the case signifies a gross breach of privacy laws. Somehow, one is led to question whether the result would have been the same, or the law would have been ready to react in the same way if it was the real artist, the original author who brought the case, as opposed to a large commercial interest?

In Campbell –v-Acuff-Rose Inc., Acuff Rose filed petition against members of the rap group, 2 Live Crew and their record company claiming infringement of their copyright in Roy Orbison’s song, Pretty Woman. The District Judge decided in favour of the 2 Live Crew, that its song was a parody that made “fair use” of the original.

In reaching their decision, the court looked at the section 107 of the 1976 Act, which provides that “the fair use of a copyright work…for purposes such criticism [or] comment is not an infringement…”, the enquiry focused on whether the new work merely superseded the objects of the original creation, or whether and to what extent it is “transformative” altering the new expression, meaning, or message. In this judgement the judge is not attempting to restrict or narrow the meaning of “fair use”. He is not attempting to limit the scope of the Act. He is trying to stretch the existing copyright law to take into account the new development in the music digital era. This, it is submitted is the general direction in which the law should be heading.

In Eldred –v- Ashcroft the Supreme Court clarified that “[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the tack of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors…in order to grant the public appropriate access to their work.” The Judge in Acuff-Rose followed the Supreme Court’s lead. He ostensibly culled from Sony Corp. –v- Universal City Studio’s Inc., to make the point that every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively…”unfair”…and then conceded that the commercial purpose of 2 Live Crew’s song was no bar to “fair use”. This court has extended the definition of “fair use” in this case. The Judge reached out further than the traditional common law rule allowed.

Around 2003, before the US Supreme Court, the primacy of traditional copyright laws were reaffirmed that “[t]he primary objective of copyright is [t]o promote the progress of science”. Sampling is science. It is a technology where new and exciting creations are happening in music. With the Internet, they make a potent combination as a catalyst for this digital age. There can be no denying that samplers borrow from other works.

Borrowing has always been regarded as standard practice in music culture. Suffocation of this practice supports the very strong argument in Eldred –v- Ashcroft that copyright fails to promote science and education, and it is time that legislators understand the need to extend the definition of “fair dealing”.

Grand Upright Music Ltd –v- Warner Bros. Records Inc., was the first sampling case. It left the judiciary confused and undecided on how the law should treat sampling. It is highlighted the urgency to extend “fair use” in view of the digital age. The case concerned a copyright infringement action against rap artist, Biz Markie’s album “I need a hair cut”.

He used three words from the original author’s recording. The court found for Grand Upright on all accounts. The case addressed the issue of ownership but not that of “fair use”. By failing to address “fair use”, the court could have been suggesting that “fair use” has no place in digital sampling. This is of course not true as digital technology is here to stay.

The case further suffers from inadequate legal reasoning, as it gave no solution to the legal mystery surrounding digital sampling. Rather, it carried out a character assassination on the defendant when the judge spoke of the defendant when the judges spoke of the “defendants disregard for the law” and opined that defendants “…only aim was to sell thousands upon thousands of records.” In stating this point the honourable may have forgotten that the whole idea of creating a record is to sell thousands of copies. The only difference here is, these were not being sold by large record companies.



















CHAPTER 5: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The global nature of the Internet suggests that there is a need for universal accord on copyright matters. The “WIPO Treaties” and the WCT in particular, protects inter alia authors and composers. Like other related protections, the WIPO treaties provide important economic incentives to creative individuals. These treaties reflect international consensus on the protections that copyright and related rights owner need. They ensure that exclusive rights are afforded to creative people to determine how a whether their works can be copied and distributed. Moreover, the treaties allow enjoyment of the creator’s economic reward fro their creativity.

To show how eager artists or record companies are to protect their copyrights, one sees that, not only are they prepared to control music outlets locally, in their individual countries, they are doing so world worldwide through various international laws. WIPO has got all areas covered. They provide an electronic engine for copyrighted products, where only legitimate copies of works are transmitted, under terms permitted by the owner. As the policy is adopted worldwide it ensures consistent protection, and prevents a ‘piracy haven’ from developing across the wide reach of the Internet.

TRIPS is another arm of international law, which gives natural law protection and a polite form of economic imperialism. It deals with substantive rights and obligations as well as procedural issues such as enforcement. TRIPS is described by Hamilton as protestant-based capitalist copyright law, which presupposes about human value effort and reward that they contain political, sociological and legal ramifications.

TRIPS is already outdated because it has failed to consider that a great deal of intellectual property will soon be online. It attempts to remake international copyright law in the image of western copyright, law under the umbrella of “trade relation”.

If TRIPS eventually becomes successful across the breathtaking sweep of signatory countries, it will be one of the most effective vehicles of western imperialism in history. It will not therefore come as a surprise if there is uneven compliance across the world even after so many countries have signed the agreement.

TRIPS, it is submitted it is nothing more than freedom imperialism and must be combated for the good of the masses. Whether such is a good idea involves difficult question of political, sociological and legal import, which should be open to debate. People must value individual achievement and believe in the appropriateness of change and originality it is going to concede to. TRIPS appeared in the midst of the online era, but it is oblivious to this era’s fundamental change in intellectual product transmission and generation. The online era, with its world communication bridge, and massive access capacity, questions the existing fences and gates of intellectual property ownership. It calls for a reassessment of their proper placement in virtual space for the promotion of science and technology and extension of fair dealing as a way of modifying copyright to fit an online universe.

The position of the European Union (EU) is one of harmonisation; the Copyright Directive was implemented to bring greater harmonisation to European Copyright law in relation to the fundamental exclusive right of copyrights and exceptions to those rights. Its other objective was to implement WIPO. Although it deals with copyright, it provides that: “the directive leaves in tact and shall in no way affect existing Community provisions”. This s not good news for the fostering fair deal if the Community laws remain in tact. Hart submits that Article 6 of the Directive met with the most controversy because it sought to implement Article 11 of WIPO which provides for “effective technological measures”.

These measures broadly defined means, prevention of restriction of acts, in respect of works or other subject matters, which are not authorised by the right holder under of any copyright, related rights or the sui generis rights. This type of provision works against the redefinition of “fair dealing” or its extension.

Grosheide noted that it has become clear from its recitals, that the new directive serves the need for a high level intellectual property protection to foster investment in creativity and innovation, including network infrastructure. Although reference is made to the position of users and the freedom of expression and dissemination of information, it is clearly not EU’s main concerns to foster them.

Grosheide further notes that “…the directive narrows down the rights of consumers with regard to digitised information particularly when this is distributed through the Internet”. This type of behaviour will have a knock on effect on the redefinition of “fair deal” or the extension of it. This is not what the information technology need it needs to embrace, for the good of the society the development of the new digital age especially in the field of music. The side effect of the directive should be to make it, together with the already adopted e-commerce directive, a safe basis for commercial activities such as music distribution online.

According to the above view, it is envisaged that any forward movements are geared more towards protecting the economic interests of the copyright holders rather than the interests of music lovers. The measures put forward have not been fully implemented by member states because it is not easy to get countries to comply. In reality, it is submitted that the music artists are no better off due to these regulations because they are too narrow and not accommodating to the redefinition of “fair dealing”. More has to be done for the interest of the masses and the digital age to embrace the new technological developments.

My daughter and her friends














My daughter and her girlfriends.

Love and bed










My sweetest moments.

Party pictures

Some shots of our last party.























Sunday, March 23, 2008


75 Grand View Blvd.
Yonkers, NY 10710
914-779-5656

Words of my love

BlondDeed (12:59:18 AM): im big on my pride'
kmarks243 (12:59:24 AM): thats good you should be
BlondDeed (1:00:21 AM): im stubborn around u and i love you. i couldnt bring myself low enough to hook up its all or nothing. besides im insecure bout myself and i dont wanan hook up with some guy whos only in it for one thing and my trust isnt what im talkin bout lol
kmarks243 (1:02:19 AM): lol thats really good babe, cuz lots of guys are assholes and when they realize they can get that they just keep expecting it and thats not how it works, commitment love trust , im big on those three things, sex is just a perk if nething, its not needed to make NE relationship work and if thats whats keepn the relationship going then there never was a relationship in the first place
BlondDeed (1:06:50 AM): ..........that was dejavu. n lie true story have iever said that to you? i swear ive said those exact words before. that was creepy. but yes thats why i love you your not like other guys you have brains. i like a guy with brains. cuz i lack it at times. and you're right thats why i think wer gonna be just fine cuz im really big on those 3 things. their the most simple and easy things that make a relationship but the hardest to maintain. ill always commit to you and no one else that was the deal from day one youll never have to worry bout me cheatin on u im not a hypocrit. trust is obviosuly gonna be a big role in this because we seem to have alot of it which is another perk and for the ill continue to love you .
kmarks243 (1:09:23 AM): lol you've truley never said that to me, that all jus was in my head, maybe thats why we are perfect, we thing the same way without even knowing it babe lol and ill always commit to you and only you and im in this relationship till the very end babe cuz I Love You Too
BlondDeed (1:10:10 AM): lol its hard to be serious with those smilies
BlondDeed (1:10:21 AM): but i like that u said that
BlondDeed (1:10:53 AM): cuz ive never heard a guy say that and once i gave up lookin for a guy like that you came along
kmarks243 (1:12:16 AM): i changed my smileys lol well hey , good things come to those who wait and those who are deserving, and from wat youve told me, you are very deserving babe, and im the same, all was hell till i threw a penny in the well...then came you, and all is swell , that rhymed and i totally just made that up
BlondDeed (1:15:00 AM): lol well thats good. ill never be ungrateful towards you because ive never had better its alwasy been hell and you showed me that maybe theyre not all the same
kmarks243 (1:16:51 AM): maybe? no maybes, im am different, but no worries, cuz u'll never find a 2nd as long as im alive that you'll question my intentions or my actions and compare me to any of ur exes cuz i AM DIFFERENT, and i want you to realize how much you mean to me and how much i'd like to mean to you cuz you've shown me so much in so little time babe
BlondDeed (1:20:06 AM): you do mean alot to me. im not gonna lie today i dunno if i had a bad dream or what but i was just paranoid. that like you would get bored with me or something. and it scared me. yesterday when u didnt text me all day cuz ur games i was suprised i wasnt scared or worried iknew ur games wer takin long. before with other guys id be paranoid and usually im right when i thnk somethin bad is happening usually it is.
kmarks243 (1:23:21 AM): you can think bad things will happen...but dont kill yourself when i show you that all is good with me and Melody, you don't ever have to worry about me getting bored with you, cuz i never know what to expect and theres never a dull moment with you, everytime we kiss i feel like its the first time, my heart still races the same and my adrenaline still kicks in hard from start to finish when your around believe me, and no matter how long it takes you to respond or nething i never fear that your doing nething wrong, with you i dont worry bout where you are or who your with, i know you wouldnt hurt me
BlondDeed (1:24:56 AM): i cant urt the best thing thats come into my life
kmarks243 (1:26:04 AM):
kmarks243 (1:26:50 AM): and i cant lose the best thing to ever happen to me either , your my good luck charm i heard the song just now on the radio again
BlondDeed (1:27:21 AM): lol iknow i hear it all the time
kmarks243 (1:28:11 AM): Me 2 and everytime i smile cuz im thinking of you
BlondDeed (1:28:44 AM): lol me too babe
BlondDeed (1:30:06 AM): whenever i hear like white people music. like accoustic songs i feel like everythings in place i love it. cuz usually i can relate the song to you and i get all cheesy
kmarks243 (1:32:15 AM): lol so many songs remind me of you, but from the beginning the 1 song that sticks in my head is back at 1, cuz no matter what i do i kno that i have to keep doing it in order to keep you, if im ever satisfied then somethn bad will happen, so everyday i start over and do what i can to "make you fall in love with me" over and over again
BlondDeed (1:34:24 AM): babe it doesnt take much to make me fall in love with you over and over again everyday
kmarks243 (1:35:30 AM): thats ok, cuz either way im still gonna look at it that way, cuz seeing you walk to your house after you get out of my car smiling is worth every bit of effort i put into that day alls i ever ask from you is a kiss b4 you leave and im good to go
BlondDeed (1:38:35 AM): lol well that makes two of us so0o thats def. not something difficult ican provide
kmarks243 (1:39:13 AM): ok good, nd not to try nd get rid of you babe but shouldnt you get some sleep b4 your exam? lol
BlondDeed (1:41:50 AM): yeah i was thinkin bout it. but i had a redbull at like 4. and sadly those keep me awake all night so0o im tryin to keep awake all ngiht and ill take a nap after my exam and before igo to graduation
kmarks243 (1:43:28 AM): lol ok, thts perfectly fine with me nd babe, if you dont want to come over saturday because of daniel just let me kno, cuz i dnt want you to be uncomfortable or nething so i understand if you dont want to
BlondDeed (1:45:03 AM): lol hes tollerable i dunno why but as f'ed up as he is ican tollerate him
kmarks243 (1:46:13 AM): lol ok, nd i told him that if you come over he has to be good and that ill set him up with the tv in my aunt n uncles room so he leaves us alone, otherwise hell be on the cpu and thts fine too, cuz i wanna be with you alonso so your not shy lol
BlondDeed (1:46:48 AM): what do u mean so shy??
BlondDeed (1:47:03 AM): i believe im not shy. nemore
kmarks243 (1:47:39 AM): no but around people you are kinda shy, like hannah or nikki you get kinda shy or around my parents...tht one i understand tho lol
kmarks243 (1:48:14 AM): im jus sayn, dont be shy to kiss me in front of people unless ur ashamed of me lol and i dnt think thts the case
BlondDeed (1:48:35 AM): lol ok babe
kmarks243 (1:49:55 AM): lol ok good, cuz sometimes i just wanna kiss you real quick but idk if you may back away cuz people are watching lol idk nvrmind im confusing myself cuz its late lol
BlondDeed (1:51:11 AM): late? more like early now lol but its okay babe i wanna kiss u real quick to0o and it doesnt bother me that ppl are watchin i just didnt wanna make it akward for them ya know? nd i didnt know howd u react to it
kmarks243 (1:52:24 AM): ill react like i always do...with a smile cuz its no secret tht we kiss n hold hands lol nd ya i understand how it may be akward for people to watch us kiss
BlondDeed (1:53:16 AM): lol no wayyyy our secrets out!?!? people know we kiss!?!?!? oh my......
kmarks243 (1:54:30 AM): lol ya babe i sowwy, i 4got to tell you...they saw our video...the one where you held my hand ever so gently and kissed me long and smoothly... i cant believe i 4got to inform you lol
BlondDeed (1:56:05 AM): lol oh really? well atleast they didnt see the toher video
BlondDeed (1:56:10 AM): other*

Definition of love

Love
Love is one of the strongest most meaningful words in the English vocabulary. Love is both an idea as well as a concept and leads to many issues in the world today. Love as an idea is used in remedy to problems and differences between individuals. When two people fall in love it is said by many to be the most amazing feeling you can experience, a feeling where you have butterflies in your heart and birds chirping in the skies flying free. Love as a concept is used worldwide to sell products such as the new fine cologne out on the market and love is often confused with another word that certainly is NOT what love is all about, lust. Love and lust are two completely different things that do however intertwine with each other from time to time. Love is not something that should ever be played with and should always be kept serious in order to keep the words integrity in place.
Love has many different shapes and forms. For instance, some people absolutely love Chinese food; this love is vastly different in comparison to two individuals falling in love with each other. Love is an eternal thing that does not ever go away, but at times does seem to slip away and in part fade. Love is the feeling that takes away all pain, yet in the same instance can cause ailment beyond all belief. A broken heart for example is the act of love gone wrong. Love is often times a one way road to disaster in young couples; however in some instances for those lucky enough it can spread everlastingly both ways and in this form is the greatest of all achievements for this kind of love is reconciled as the two individuals being soul mates.
Love does many things in a man or woman’s life. The most important act of these things is that love can work wonders in making people happy. Love drives people to do out of the ordinary acts that make life worth living. Without love many lives have no meaning. So many actions that human beings take in life can be related and drawn back to the source of love. Love has expanded the economy on holidays such as Valentines Day and thanks to people getting married and all sorts of anniversaries, people find who are in love find themselves buying jewelry, cards, chocolate, candy hearts, and all sorts of other crazy items just to prove their love and devotion to another being. Love is not bound to just two people however; one can love other things such as a certain type of food, maybe a specific “secret” spot in the city or even a holiday. Love takes more forms than any other feeling known to man.
Perhaps the most important aspect of love is its ability to open the doors of happiness to anyone and everyone. From the poorest man on earth to the richest of the richest, it can change your outlook on life in a second. So you have all the money in the world, does this make you happy? All of the fast cars and biggest houses can not amount to the feeling that love can bring you. Money changes the way you think and feel in short periods of time. True love can change your feelings and thoughts for eons to come. Money is good, but love is an eternal ongoing act that devours your body and runs through your brain like electricity through a light socket. It strikes in the blink of an eye and opens your eyes to things you never before were able to see. Love is the key to all happiness, everyone has heard this saying and we have all pondered what exactly it means. This means that no matter how happy you are, if you have never learned to love then you have never truly hit the jackpot, you have never hit the high of all highs. When you fall in love the only thing that truly scares you is losing that love. There is not another thing in the world that relates to that.
So what exactly does love come down to? Love is the greatest feeling on earth. Love is the key to eternal happiness. Love is what makes marriages work and people stay together and happy. Love is not something that is to be toyed with. Neither man nor woman can complete a life to the fullest until they have met their match and have fallen in love. Love is the greatest feeling and greatest ability that has been given to people on this earth. Money and possessions can not ever amount to the things love can bring to one person. Love is a word of a million definitions, what is yours?